Up 1,869% in twelve months on revenue that has declined three straight quarters.

• The rerating. Wolfspeed emerged from Chapter 11 on September 29, 2025 with debt cut by ~$4.6B (~70%). The new equity has compounded from ~$3 to $65.78 — including +186% in the last 30 days, after a Citrini Research note on May 12, 2026 named it the single-stock highlight for AI infrastructure.
• The income statement. Quarterly revenue has fallen three consecutive prints ($197M → $169M → $150M, with Q4 FY26 guided $140–160M). GAAP gross margin sits at −27%, while Infineon, onsemi, STMicro, and Coherent all earn between +29% and +39% on the same end markets.
• The decisive print. Both bull and bear cases converge on Q1 FY27 (~Nov 2026): Mohawk Valley revenue above $120M with GAAP GM above −15% would validate the rerating; below $100M with GM still below −15% would force sell-side to cut FY28 toward the $700–900M bear band.

A pre-packaged bankruptcy reset everything except the operating problem.

Before: Between FY22 and FY24, Wolfspeed borrowed roughly $5.1B to build two greenfield 200mm SiC plants — Mohawk Valley device fab (NY) and the John Palmour Manufacturing Center (NC). Total debt hit $6.5B against shareholders' equity of −$447M; capex peaked at 2.8× revenue in FY24. The EV demand pull that justified the build never arrived on schedule.

Pivot: Going-concern language surfaced in May 2025; Wolfspeed filed a prepackaged Chapter 11 on June 30, 2025 and emerged September 29 with debt cut by ~$4.6B, a fully reconstituted 7-person board, a new CEO (Robert Feurle, May 2025), a new CFO (Gregor van Issum, Sept 2025), and legacy shareholders left with ~5% of the new equity.

Today: Net debt is ~$0.6B, annual cash interest is down ~60%, the ~$700M Section 48D advanced-manufacturing tax refund has been collected, and capex steps down from $2.27B in FY24 to ~$0.2B in FY26. The balance sheet is fixed. The income statement is not.

Balance sheet rebuilt. Income statement still broken.

Mohawk Valley underutilization is the binding constraint — fixed depreciation, labor, and overhead are running across too few wafer starts. Fresh-start accounting cut net PP&E from $3.92B to $717M and steps D&A down ~$30M/quarter, but the underutilization charge was $105M in FY25 and $124M in FY24. The next two prints will reveal whether the gross-margin bridge is operating leverage or accounting basis change.

The market is paying for an AI revenue stream Wolfspeed has refused to quantify.

• AI as a multiple, not a metric. Citrini Research named Wolfspeed its single-stock highlight for AI infrastructure on May 12 — pure narrative event, no fundamental disclosure. Management has guided AI data-center growth at +50% QoQ in Q2 FY26 and +30% QoQ in Q3 — a decelerating sequential rate on a base it has refused to quantify in dollars across two consecutive prints.
• The moat that expires inside the bull horizon. The Infineon wafer LTA — the cleanest third-party validation in the file — was expanded in May 2024 and runs through ~2030, the same window Infineon's Kulim Phase 2 fab (~€5B, the world's largest 200mm SiC fab) targets for commercial output. Wolfspeed's substrate share collapsed from ~62% (2018) to ~33% (2024); Chinese share went 10% → 40%; substrate ASPs fell ~30% in 2024.
• The fresh-start tailwind. The 19-point Q3 FY26 GM improvement (−46% → −27%) was driven largely by the Durham 150mm closure and fresh-start D&A relief, not utilization recovery. Until the underutilization charge is disclosed separately and shrinking, the GM bridge is accounting basis, not operating leverage.

A class action covers the exact ramp narrative the bulls are now extrapolating.

• The Mohawk Valley class period. Securities class action M.D.N.C. 26-cv-00018 covers August 16, 2023 to November 6, 2024 — alleging Wolfspeed issued overly optimistic Mohawk Valley revenue projections without disclosing operational obstacles. Stayed by Chapter 11; Federman & Sherwood announced a parallel investigation on January 15, 2026. The FY2026 10-K is the first hard disclosure window.
• The customer-creditor-owner. Renesas owns ~38.7% of post-emergence equity, holds convertible notes, sits on the board, and is also a customer that pre-paid $2B for SiC capacity. Top-2 customers were 37% of FY25 revenue; identities are not disclosed. The forensic file notes Renesas, with consenting noteholders, can effectively control the new entity.
• The credibility deficit. Per the DEF 14A (record date October 14, 2025), all current directors and executive officers as a group (9 persons) collectively held only 178 shares — and those shares are attributable to a single executive (David T. Emerson). Management dropped its design-ins/design-wins KPI immediately after Lowe's departure, walked back the $3B annual revenue target, abandoned the Saarland fab, restructured a $750M direct CHIPS grant into ~$700M of tax credits, and deferred the new long-term financial model to 2H CY2026.